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DIVERSE CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTIONS
IN RISK REGULATION
PETER H. HUANG
In response to Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regu-
lation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (2008).
In the movie Legally Blonde, a civil procedure professor tells her
first-year students on their first day of class at Harvard Law School that
Aristotle stated, "The law is reason free from passion."1 Since Aris-
totle, there has been much written about whether passion and reason
are complements or substitutes.) In Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk
Regulation, Professor Dan M. Kahan analyzes two important and re-
lated questions: First, what roles do emotions play in risk perceptions?
Second, what is the regulatory significance of these roles?
Professor Kahan describes three models of how individuals can
perceive risk-namely, as rational weighers, irrational weighers, or
cultural evaluators.' For rational weighers, emotions play no role in
risk cognition but can show up as consequential by-products of infor-
mation processing. This is a normative as opposed to descriptive
model, 5 based upon the consequentialist expected utility theory of
neoclassical economics). For irrational weighers, emotions play a heu-
ristic role in risk cognition due to bounds on computational abilities,
information, and time. Emotions are distortions that underlie cogni-
Harold E. Kohn Chair Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law, Temple
University. Thanks to David Hoffman foi helpful discussions.
LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001).
2 See, e.g., RICHARD S. LAZARUS & BERNICE N. LAZARUS, PASSION AND REASON:
MAKING SENSE OF OUR EMOTIONS 198-215 (1994) (arguing that there is a basic logic to
human emotional responses).
156 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (2008).
4 I. at 744-52.
) See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk Perception in Plwyhot and Economics, 20 ECON.
INQUIRY 1, 8 (1982) (making "a case for the proposition that an important class of in-
tertemporal markets shows systematic deviations from individual rational behavior and
that these deviations are consonant with evidence from veiy different sotrces collected
by psychologists").
See, e.g., KENNETHJ. ARROW, Utility and Expeclalion in Economic Behavio, in 6 PSY-
CHOLOG: A STUDY OF SCIENCE 724-52 (Signmund Koch ed., 1963), reprinted in 3 COL-
LECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE UNDER CERTAINTY AND
UNCERTAINTY 117-18 (1984) (analyzing the basics of utility theory).
(435)
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tive biases. This is a descriptive model, based upon empirical and ex-
perimental data from cognitive and social psychology and behavioral
economics.' Lastly, for cultural evaluators, emotions play an expres-
sive role in risk cognition. Emotions enable people to identify social
meanings of risk that cohere with their values. This model is also de-
scriptive, with roots in Aristotelian philosophy, and based upon recent
experimental and empirical research in affective, cognitive, and social
neuroscience and psychology.8
Professor Kahan persuasively explains how a vast body of empirical
and experimental data refutes the idea that people are rational
weighers.' That research is, however, consistent with people being ei-
ther irrational weighers or cultural evaluators. He demonstrates that
conceiving of emotions as biases, as opposed to expressive percep-
tions, has vastly different normative and prescriptive implications for
risk regulation.
Viewing emotions as biases implies that in order to protect risk
regulation from an irrational public, regulatory authority should re-
side with scientifically trained professionals who have technical risk
expertise staffing independent, politically insulated agencies. Profes-
sor Kahan notes that attempts to educate the public are not only
doomed to fail, but also are worse than futile due to laypeople's lack
of time and capacity to understand complex scientific risk data." In-
stead of arousing public fears by discussing low probability risks, au-
thorities can and should redirect public attention toward other issues.
Viewing emotions as expressive perceptions implies that in order
to protect risk regulation from becoming culturally and morally im-
poverished, regulatory authority should not be delegated solely to ex-
perts. According to Professor Kahan, policies can frame contested
risk issues to affirm cultural identities and express a plurality of social
meanings to assist diverse groups in converging upon consensus. De-
liberative risk communication strategies can educate inappropriate
7 See, e.g., OlofJohansson-Stenman, Mad Cows, leroristm and.]unk Food: Should Pillb-
lic Poli, Reflect Perceived oi Obieclive Risks , 27J. HEALTH ECON. (forthcoming 2008).
A See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Culloral Evaluations of Risk: "Values" or
"Blunders"?, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 166 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
forum /issues/ 119/feb06/ kahan slovic.pdf.
See Kahan, supia note 3, at 752-53 (arguing that studies demonstrating that "indi-
viduals conform their assessments of [an activity's] risks to their emotional apprais-
als ... weigh [] decisively against the rational weigher theory").
0 at 760.
11 Id. at 764.
DIVERSE CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTIONS
emotional evaluations. 2 An infamous example of an inappropriate
emotional reaction was Michael Dukakis's passionless reply in a presi-
dential debate when asked, "Governor, if Kitty Dukakis were raped
and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable death penalty for the
killer?"'3
Professor Kahan succeeds in challenging Professor Cass Sunstein's
view that emotions are biases, and refuting the policy implication that
politically insulated experts free of emotional biases should conduct
risk regulation.'' Professor Kahan emphasizes viewing emotions as
expressive perceptions and espouses the attendant policy implication
that reconciling technically sound risk regulations and democratic,
genuinely participatory policymaking is possible.
This Response makes five points. First, emotions can be con-
ceived of as more than just biases or expressive perceptions. Second,
different conceptions of emotions are descriptively accurate for dif-
ferent emotions of different people in different situations at different
times. Third, risk perception and regulation involve not only negative
emotions, such as anger, anxiety, and fear, but also positive emotions,
such as contentment, hope, and serenity. Fourth, a conception of
emotions as expressive perceptions has a)plications in other areas of
law and public policy besides risk regulation. Fifth, people of differ-
ent cultural identities tend to have different emotional reactions to-
ward different governmental nonregulatory responses to risks depend-
ing on the perceived social meanings of those responses.
I. OTHER CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTIONS
Conceptions about what roles emotions play in decision making
vary across disciplines, such as artificial intelligence,' decision sci-
ences,'6 economics,' and evolutionary science. 8 Views about how law
12 ld. at 765.
1 George H. W. Bush & Michael Dukakis, Commission on Presidential Debates:
The Second Bush-Dukakis Presidential Debate (Oct. 13, 1988) (debate transcript),
available at http:// N.debates.oi-g/pages/trans88b.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
14 See Kahan, suna note 3, at 743 (discussing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:
BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 126 (2005)).
1, See generlly ROSALIND W. PICARD, AFFECTIVE COMPUTING (1997); Herbert A.
Simon, Mltivational and Emotional Covtrols qf'Cognition, 74 PSYCHOL. REV. 29 (1967).
16 See genetrally DO EMOTIONS HELP OR HURT DECISION MAKING?: A HEDGEFOXIAN
PERSPECTIVE (Kathleen D. Vohs et al. eds., 2007).
17 See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Alice M. Isen, A Model ?/ he Elel u/Alel on
Economic Decision Making, 6 QUJANTITATIVE MARKETING & ECON. 17, 35 (2008).
is See geneially EMOTION, EVOLUTION, AND RATIONALITY (Dylan Evans & Pierre
Cruse eds., 2004).
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and emotions, generally,' are related also vary across fields of law,
such as constitutional law, 0 criminal law,2 ' international environ-
mental law,22 litigation, property law,2' securities regulation, and tax
law compliance.
It is therefore unsurprising that legal scholars have diverse
views about how regulation should respond to emotions. Jeremy
Blumenthal considers paternalism in response to emotions,2 ' and
emotional misforecasting 8  Howard Chang advocates that regulatory
policy should respect some public fears. 9 Rachel Moran contends
that regulation should take into account public fear and other emo-
tions.30 Cass Sunstein wants regulatory policy to disrespect irrational
19 See generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); TeiY A. Ma-
roney, Low and Emotion: A Proposed Iaxonomy n/an Emerging Field, 30 LAw & HUM. BE-
HA\. 119 (2006); Law and the Emotions: New Directions in Scholarship, Conference
held at the Boalt Hall School of Law, Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 8-9, 2007), available at
https://ww.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotionconference/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2008).
20 See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making,
2005 WIS. L. Rnv. 115.
21 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Gendei and Emotion in Ciminal Law, 28 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 447 (2005).
22 See, e.,g, Peter H. Huang, International Environmgntal Law and Emnotional Rational
Choice, 31J. LEGAL STUD. S237 (2002).
23 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Rsponses in Litigation, 12
INT'L REV. L. &ECON. 31 (1992).
24 See, e.g ., Peter H. Huang, Reasons With in Posion s: Emotions & Intentions in Prop)-
erly Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REN. 435 (2000).
2o See Peter H. Huang, Ilow Do Secuitiles Laws Influence A//eel, Iappiness, and Tist?,
3J. Bus. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2008); Peter H. Huang, Moody Ivesting and the Su-
pie/ne Couit: Rethinking the iValefiality q/In/bmalion and the Reasonableness of/Inveslo s, 13
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99 (2005); Peter H. Huang, Regulating Inrttinnal Exubeonce and
Anxiety in Securities MaIkets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501
(Francesco Paresi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005); Peter H. Huang, Tiust, Guilt, and Se-
curities Regulatio, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (2003).
26 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Withot More Law: A Theoo
q/Social Norts and Oganizational Cultues, 10J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994).
27 See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalisn, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REN. 1
(2007).
28 See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems n/ AJfective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005).
29 See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and the
Horimones Dis)ute: Nothing Tn tear but Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 743 (2004).
?10 Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound: A Repy to Prh/sor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 1
(2002).
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public fears.3 Professor Kahan challenges Professor Sunstein's con-
ception of emotions as mere heuristics.
But, there are other conceptions of emotions besides those of irra-
tional biases or expressive perceptions. In particular, another concep-
tion of emotions in risk perception is as behavioral processes, which
are often unconscious. 3 3 This conception is related to a novel contex-
tual, situational model of human behavior', that differs from both
neoclassical rational actor models and recent behavioral economics
models. That model is also consistent with recent neuroscience re-
search finding evidence of distinct "wanting" and "liking" systems in
brains. A conception of emotions as behavioral processes implies
that a well-functioning republicanism is better suited to conduct risk
regulation than either experts insulated from public emotion or
greater direct participatory democracy. Finally, such a conception of
emotions also suggests a more coherent view of welfare or well-being
as processes than as objects.
II. DIVERSITY OF EMOTIONS
A desirable and important feature of viewing emotions as cultur-
ally expressive perceptions is that it explicitly acknowledges the reality
that people of different ages, ethnicities, genders, races, and other
identities perceive risk differently. There is a large body of evidence
that risk perceptions generally vary across gender and race.'" There is
also recent evidence finding different information-processing re-
sponses to emotional advertisements due to motivational and cogni-
Se generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007).
See Kahan, supra note 3, at 743. See generally Paul Slovic et al., The A//eel Jleurisli,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIV1E JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
?"?, See David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and
Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for the Law 22 (Aug. 20, 2007) (unpublished manu-
script), available at Iittp://ssirn.coil/abstiract-1003562 ("Mounting evidence shows that
emotions can operate independently of... conscious or reasoned thought and that
nonconscious processing is vital to behavior.").
1 SeeJon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Characeer: A Crilical Realist Pi
wetive on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 120 (2004) (discussing the "situational
character model," which assumes that human behavior is often "a manifestation of...
interior and exterior situational influences to which we are largely blind").
See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience and Pater
nalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 97-98 (2006) (profiling, for example, the obsessive-
compulsive disorder sufferer who "wants to clean but does not like it").
" See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Prtective C(nition: Explaining
the While-Male Efcl in Risk Perception, 4J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007) (examin-
ing why white men are generally less risk averse than women or minorities).
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tive changes associated with aging.37  Similarly, there are numerous
empirical findings providing evidence that: female mutual fund man-
agers follow less extreme investment styles, take less risk, and trade
less than male fund managers; s retirement investment behavior dif-
fers by gender and marital status; 9 individual stock trading involves
higher turnover for and lower performance by men than women;40
women invest less than men in most studies of simple investment
choices, and thus appear to be financially more risk averse than men;41
and the Survey of Consumer Finances' financial risk tolerance meas-
12
ure differs significantly over ethnicities and racial categories.
Variation in risk attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, perceptions, and tol-
erances across various discrete classifications to which the U.S. Consti-
tution guarantees equal protection43 raises difficult issues of equality,
equity, and justice. Some researchers propose that regulatory "agen-
cies and financial educators should target investor education on in-
vestments and financial risk to racial and ethnic groups in order to
promote better choices for investing for financial goals., 44 Others,
such as political scientist Scott Page, utilize game theory, experimental
studies, and simulations to make compelling arguments that diversity
creates benefits." Business law professor Joan Heminway suggests that
diversity and independence among a board of directors might be de-
sirable because women and men may have different bases for trust
?,7 Patti Williams & Aimee Drolet, Age-Related Di//eences in Respqonses to Emotional Ad-
vertisements, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 343 (2005).
38 Alexandra Niessen & Stefan Ruenzi, Sex Matteis: Gender Dierences in a Pujes-
sional Selling (Univ. of Cologne Ctr. for Fin. Res., Working Paper No. 06-01, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-966243.
39 Annika E. Sinden & BrianJ. Surette, Gende Ii//erences in (he Allocation o/Assets in
Retirement Savings Plans, 88 AM. ECON. RnV. 207, 209-10 (1998).
40 Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overcofidence, and
Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261 (2001).
41 See, e.g., Peggy D. Dwsyer et al., Gender Di//eences in Revealed Risk Taking: Evidence
from Mutual Fund Investors, 76 ECON. LETTERS 151 (2002); Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos
& Alexandra Bernasek, Are Women More Risk Aveise?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 620 (1998). But
.see Renate Schubert et al., FinactialDecision-Waking: Are Women Really More Risk-Ave. e?,
89 AM. ECON. REV. 381 (1999).
42 Rui Yao et al., The Financial Risk 7oletance uJ Blacks, Hispani and Whites, 16 FIN.
COUNSELING & PLAN. 51, 56-59 (2005).
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection Clause).
44 Yao et al., supra note 42, at 51.
4) SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DDERSITY CREATES BET-
TER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007).
DIVERSE CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTIONS
S 46
and trustworthiness. Sociologist Brooke Harrington documents a
"diversity premium" for stock investment clubs, finding that stock
portfolios of mixed-gender investment clubs outperform those of sin-
gle-gender clubs." Variation of risk perceptions across identities also
raises questions about how most of us who have multiple personal and
professional identities alternate between possibly conflicting identities
and their associated emotions as culturally expressive perceptions. In
one study, college students whose "academic" identities had been
primed were more likely to choose more academic periodicals com-
pared to students whose "socialite" identities had been triggered; in
another study, Chinese Americans whose American identities were
made more salient exhibited more stereotypically American prefer-
ences for competition and individuality as opposed to cooperation
and collectivism when their Chinese identities were evoked. 
s
A fundamental but implicit premise in Professor Kahan's analysis
is a winner-take-all competition based upon empirical and experimen-
tal studies between three alternative models of emotions in risk per-
ception. 4t But, in reality, no single model of emotions in risk percep-
tion can accurately describe all roles that all emotions play for all
people, in all situations, during all times, facing all risks. In fact, all
models are wrong by definition in the sense of being sim)lifications of
reality. All models are incomplete because they have to leave out
some aspects of reality, just like all maps are incorrect, unless they
have a one-to-one scale.
Another question about Ina)s and models is whether they are
more or less helpful for different purposes. Different maps are more
or less useful for assisting navigation in a building, neighborhood,
city, county, state, country, planet, solar system, or galaxy. A rational
weigher of risks was never intended to be a descriptive model of actual
behavior, but instead a normative ideal toward which some people
and organizations might choose to strive. For certain people in cer-
tain situations at certain times, certain emotions are more accurately
conceived of as biases and other emotions are more accurately con-
46Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and Copmrate Boards, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 173 (2007).
47 BROOKE HARRINGTON, POP FINANCE: INVESTMENT CLUBS AND THE NEW INVES-
TOR POPULISM (forthcoming 2008).
48 Robyn A. LeBoeuf & Eldar B. Shafir, Decision Making, in THE CAMBRIDGE HAND-
BOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 243, 257-58 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morri-
son eds., 2005) (describing both studies).
49 See Kahan, supia note 3, at 744-52 (highlighting the rational weigher, irrational
weigher, and cultural evaliator theories).
2008]
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ceived of as expressive perceptions. Emotions are fluid in their status
across people, situations, and time. In other words, the roles emo-
tions play in risk perception are not fixed and stable characteristics of
an individual; rather, they change from situation to situation and time
to time. Like preferences, risk perceptions are not so much revealed
as they are constructed, formed, or learned. A In particular, emotions
and risk perceptions are sensitive to context and framing.
III. POSITIvE EMOTIONS
George Loewenstein, a behavioral economist, eloquently observed
recently that "part of the purpose of being alive is to be alive, which
means having a range of emotions."" An implicit aspect of Professor
Kahan's analysis is his exclusive focus on negative emotions. This is
understandable because the irrational weigher model also focuses ex-
clusively on negative emotions. Moreover, in terms of a general prin-
ciple across a broad range of psychological phenomena, including
emotions, "bad is stronger than good. '' 52 However, there has been a
recent surge of interest across disciplinary boundaries about positive
eniotions,5' in particular happiness.5'
Professor Kahan concludes his Article by advocating for "an open
mind in our continued investigation of what emotion contributes to
), See generally THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul
Slovic eds., 2006).
,1 Niklas Karlsson, George Loewenstein &Jane McCafferty, The Economics of Mean-
ing, in EXOTIC PREFERENCES: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HUMAN MOTIVATION 33,
34 (George Loewenstein ed., 2007).
)2 Roy F. Batimeister et al., Bad Is Slronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323
(2001).
, See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psycholq© of Emotional
Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Them and Practice, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1045, 1066-70 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBALUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:
DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)) (pointing out benefits positive emotions can
have on decision making in the context of litigation, public policymaking, etc.).
)4 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Authentic Ilappiness, Self Knowledge, and Legal Poliy, 9
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-1084043; Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Institutions, Law,
and Polio, in HANDBOOK OF POSITVE PSYCHOLOGY (Shane J. Lopez ed., 2d ed., forth-
coming 2008), available at http://www.law.temiple.edu/faculty/woi-kshops/
HuangBlumentalHandbkPosPScyhol.pdf, Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal,
Posilive Law and Policy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (Shane J. Lopez ed.,
forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com /abstract- 1082594; Peter H. Huang &
Rick Swedloff, Authentic Happine," and Meaning at Law Firns, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 335
(2008).
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risk perception and what its significance is for risk regulation."'
However, lie continues, "[W] e ought to be motivated as well by a mor-
ally discerning fear of all we stand to lose if we reach the wrong con-
clusion." We certainly should keep an open mind in continuing to
analyze roles that emotions play in risk perception and regulation.
But in addition to being motivated by a negative emotion-e.g., fear
of what we could lose-we could and should also be motivated by two
positive emotions: optimism about and hope for all that we stand to
gain by reaching a constructive conclusion. Much is at stake in con-
tested risk issues, not only in objective terms and substantive conse-
quences, but also in subjective terms and procedural concerns.
People are motivated not only to avoid negative emotions, but also
to seek out positive emotions. The Positive Affectivity and Negative
Affectivity Scale (PANAS) consists of ten positive affects and ten nega-
tive affects.5' Emotions, like other forms of affect such as feelings and
moods, can be categorized according to a widely accepted "circum-
plex" model of affect that organizes affective concepts in a circle in a
two-dimensional plane with a horizontal axis depicting valence rang-
ing from "displeasure" to "pleasure" and a vertical axis indicating de-
gree of arousal)'s Happiness, for example, can entail a state of high
arousal as with excitement and exuberance, but can also involve states
of low arousal, as with contentment and serenity.
It is crucial to emphasize that positive affect is not merely the ab-
sence of negative affect. For example, people might enjoy a sense of
relief upon avoiding negative affect, but such feelings differ from
those of attaining positive affect. People often experience changes in
their emotions in terms of gains and losses relative to some bench-
mark reference point, just as prospect theory assumes that individuals
experience and evaluate changes in their wealth relative to a status
quo. '9 Focusing only upon negative emotions ignores roles positive
emotions play in risk perception and regulation. In fact, regulators, as
)) Kahan, supra note 3, at 766.
)6 ld.
)7 MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW POSITIVE PSY-
CHOLOGYTO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT 33 (2002).
,A James A. Russell, A Cirumplex Model u'A//fect, 39J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1161, 1167 (1980).
)9 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Pr.u)ec Theo: An Analysis (?f
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277 (1979) (" [V] alue should be treated as a
function in two arguments: the asset position that serves as reference point, and the
magnitude of the change ... fi-o1 that reference point.").
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much as the average citizen, can be motivated by emotional percep-
tions of risks. Administrative agency staff members, elected officials,
judges, legislators, politicians, prosecutors, and public defenders all
can be motivated by positive affect including courage and pride. For
example, some advocate raising marginal income tax rates to make
people happier, or reforming corporate governance to increase
shareholder happiness. Recently two economists proposed that cen-
tral banks, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve, utilize survey data on con-
tentment and happiness in a variety of ways to design monetary pol-
icy."' First, central banks can statistically estimate how inflation and
unem)loyment affect people's average life satisfaction.' Second, cen-
tral banks can analyze how such impacts differ across groups indexed
by age, education, gender, income, and political affiliation. Third,
central banks can identify channels by which macroeconomic fluctua-
tions affect individual subjective well-being." Fourth, central banks
can analyze how much people adapt to high rates of inflation and un-
enploylnent.( 7
60 See Sharon Begley, When It's Head Veisu.s Headt, the Heat Wins, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
11, 2008, at 34.
61 See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & James A. McConvill, Slop Taxing Jlappiness: A New Pi
sj)ective on Progressive Taxation, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 65, 89-90 (2005) (arguing that higher
taxes on the wealthy will increase the total level of the community's welfare without
diminishing net happiness since "mega-wealth []" does not lead to greater happiness).
But see Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Happines and Public Poliy: A Partial Dissent
(ar, Mh a DepArtment q/ Iomeland Happiness Would Be a Bad Idea), 22 J.L. & POL. 283,
288-95 (2006) (providing reasons for why it is not feasible to calibrate tax policy to
achieve maximal societal happiness).
62 See, e.tg., James McConvill, The Sepatation uY" One hip and Control Uder a Happi
ness-Based Thery q/ the Coporation, 26 COMPANY LAw. 35 (2005). But see Harry G.
Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, Against Shareholder AIartc ;paton: A Treatment for McConvill's
Psychonomicoss, 2 BROOK.J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 41 (2007) (providing a critical analy-
sis of McConxill's conclusions).
C1 See general y Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacClloch, Iappiness, Contentment and
)ther Emotions Jo (enrAl Banks (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13622, 2007), available at http://wwv.nbei.oig/papeis/w13622 (providing evidence
that life contentment is negatively correlated with inflation and unemployment).
Ld. at 10.
6) ld. at 22-23.
L d. at 23-24.
67 Id. at 25.
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IV. EMOTIONS AS ExPRESSIvE PERCEPTIONS IN
OTHER CONTESTED ISSUES
In addition to examples of contested risk issues that Professor Ka-
han and his coauthors from the Cultural Cognition Project have al-
ready investigated or plan to investigate, emotions arise in many
other legal and public policy contexts that do not involve risks. For
example, Professor Kahan discusses how some people have negative
feelings about evaluating risks based upon cost-benefit analysis and as-
sociated welfarist policyniaking. 9 But, those same people are likely to
feel equally negative about cost-benefit analyses being applied to a
riskless environment. Emotions can be expressive perceptions even
when there is no risk involved. For example, people disagree about
commensurability,'' and the meaning of such contested commodities
as donor eggs or sperm, intellectual property, organ sales, and prosti-
tution, even if there is no risk. More generally, people respond either
unemotionally or emotionally and usually negatively to utilizing eco-
nomics, metaphors about markets, and rhetoric about rationality in
nonbusiness areas of law.71
Many laws provide social meanings. People have a deep-rooted
and fundamental desire for meaning in terms of making sense of their
lives. 2 Behavioral economist George Loewenstein has observed that
"humans are, in effect, meaning-making machines. Even when we are
asleep, our brains are busy constructing a narrative that makes sense
of the random firings of our neurons .... [P] eople are often willing to
sacrifice other goals, such as wealth and time, for meaning."'7 In the
legal academy, there has long been a tension between consequential-
ist, utilitarian theories of law and procedural, deontological theories
of law. This opposition is most readily apparent in the different ways
CI See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You
Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Ierils of Conitive Illiberatism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssin.com/abstiact-1081227. See generally The
Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://iesearch.yale.edu/
culturalcognition/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
6 See Kahan, .uina note 3, at 754-55.
70 Peter H. Huang, Dangers of 'Monetay (ommesurability: A Plychologcal Game Model
of Contagion, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1707-09 (1998) (analyzing contested and varied
notions of commensurability).
71 Peter H. Huang, Emotional Reactions to Law and Ecootics, Market lMetphoA, and
Ralionalily Rhetoic, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Mark D.
White ed., forthcoming 2009).
72 See, e.g., Niklas Karlsson et al., Ihe Economis qf'Meaning, 30 NORDICJ. POL. ECON.
61, 67-68 (2004).
7, Karlsson, Loewenstein & McCafferty, supra note 51, at 34-35.
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that law and economics scholars and law and philosophy scholars ap-
proach meanings of contract, criminal, property, and tort law. Some-
times these differences can become quite heated and take on a per-
sonal nature.
As George Loewenstein sagely points out, "[A] cademia is a nasty
environment, strewn with hidden traps and populated by hostile, terri-
torial tribes protecting their ideas with a ferocity akin to what one
would expect a parent to direct at someone trying to steal his baby."'
He recounts a story about how a graduate advisor of his wrote a paper
entitled "Beliefs as Possessions," which argues, "[P]eople treat their
beliefs as they do possessions-e.g. defending them from attack or
theft. Given the heat of the emotion behind the protectiveness, 'Be-
liefs as Babies' strikes me as more on-target."7 5 One reason people
hold onto their beliefs so dearly is that they emotionally identify with
those beliefs. People's identities are intimately wrapped up with their
beliefs, cultural frames, and worldviews because those are the lenses
through which they perceive their world. People behave in ways and
make choices that are consistent with and signal their identities to
others and possibly themselves.
V. NONREGULATORY RESPONSES To RisKs
Finally, Professor Kahan does not discuss what risk regulation en-
tails, but presumably he has in mind a standard repertoire or toolbox
of regulations, including command-and-control type regulations,
mandatory information disclosure, market-minicking regulations, and
subsidies or taxes. In fact, whether government should respond to
risks by regulation, and if so, how, exemplify contested issues about
which people feel different emotions as expressive perceptions.
A fundamental insight of modern financial economics is that peo-
ple can diversify, hedge, insure, reallocate, and trade risks if there are
a sufficient number of competitive asset markets indexed by those
risks.71 Risks include not only such well-known risks as illness, rising
oil prices, and volatile currency rate fluctuations, but also such risks as
74 George Loewenstein, Inlroduclion to EXOTIC PREFERENCES: BEHAVIORAL ECO-
NOMICS AND HUMAN MOTIVATION, .sufra note 51, at xiii.
7) Ld. at xiii n.2.
76 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role (f Securilies in the Optimal Allocation (/'Risk-Bearing,
31 REN. ECON. STUD. 91, 91 (1964).
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declining housing prices, increasing rates of inflation or unemploy-
ment, falling lifetime incomes, and rising inequalities in income.''
In addition to risk regulation, governments can respond to risks
by creating, expanding, promoting, or subsidizing competitive securi-
ties markets indexed by those risks. One legal scholar has recently
proposed that all government decision making be based upon predic-
tion markets, also known as idea futures markets, information mar-
kets, or virtual stock markets.' s But, as with risk regulation, people of
different cultural identities will have different emotional reactions to
perceived social meanings of such nonregulatory responses to risks.
CONCLUSION
I concur with Professor Kahan that emotions can be cultural
evaluations and that conceptions of emotions have important and
novel regulatory implications. My response to his thesis comes in the
form of five suggestions offered in a spirit of friendly amendment.
First, conceptions of emotions other than as biases or expressive per-
ceptions are worthy of study. Second, different conceptions accu-
rately describe different emotions that different people have at differ-
ent times for different situations. Third, positive emotions, as much as
negative emotions, figure into risk perception and regulation. Fourth,
viewing emotions as expressive perceptions has other applications in
law and public policy besides risk regulation. Fifth, there are non-
regulatory responses to risk that people with different cultural identi-
ties have, due to different emotional reactions to alternative perceived
social meanings.
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77 See geneally ROBERTJ. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2003).
78 See geneally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICz, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING (2007).
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